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Abstract  
In the present interview, Jacob Rogozinski elucidates the main concepts and theses he developed in 
his latest book dedicated to the issue of modern jihadism. On this occasion, he explains his 
disagreements with other philosophical (Badiou, Baudrillard, Žižek) and anthropological (Girard) 
accounts of Islamic terrorism. Rogozinski also explains that although jihadism betrays Islam, it 
nonetheless has everything to do with Islam. Eventually, he describes his own philosophical journey 
which led him from a phenomenological study of the ego and the flesh to the study of past (witch-
hunts, French Reign of Terror) and contemporary (jihadism) terror apparatuses.  
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PJCV: Jacob Rogozinski, your latest book introduces a new philosophical analysis of 
jihadism. Philosophers like Derrida, Baudrillard, Badiou, and Žižek, to name just a few, 
already tried to understand this phenomenon. What distinguishes your approach from 
theirs? Have you been discontent with the philosophical essays published in the aftermath 
of 9/11 and after the most recent attacks in France and Europe?  Was this your main reason 
for writing this book? 
 
Jacob Rogozinski: The recent terror attacks in France and Europe prompted me to write 
this book. I have to say that I was not content with the analyses made by those 
philosophers. It seems to me that most of them approached the phenomenon of jihadism 
by insufficiently considering its religious references, that is to say, its rooting in Islam. When 
Badiou defines jihadism as a kind of “fascistic nihilism,”1 he his wrong in two respects: first, 
                                                          
1 See Alain Badiou, “Philosophy and the ‛war against terrorism’”, in Infinite Thought (New York: 
Continuum), 141-163. For the philosophical critique of Badiou’s theses see Jacob Rogozinski, 
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by equating a new phenomenon to an old and different one (fascism) and, secondly, by 
claiming that we are dealing with people who no longer believe in anything. Since 
Nietzsche, this is indeed the definition of “nihilism.” Can we really name nihilists men who 
are willing to kill and die in the name of their beliefs? Badiou only sees in the religious 
dimension of jihadism a superficial “disguise,” that is to say, a mask that would conceal a 
deeper reality. What kind of reality? The “desire for the West” and the ravages of global 
capitalism. In the same vein, Žižek states that the violence of fundamentalists is just one of 
the forms of violence related to global capitalism.2 Baudrillard said the same thing in a more 
sophisticated way by calling terrorism “the shadow” of the “system of domination,” its 
internal “counterapparatus.”3 All those statements amount to ignore the peculiarity of 
modern jihadism. Ultimately, such stances can lead to excuse jihadists of their crimes by 
merely seeing them as victims of global capitalism. This trend is present in some far-left 
circles. These people believe that “victims,” whatever they do, are always right. They do not 
see that when people revolt against the system which is oppressing them, their revolt may 
be misguided, captured by what I call terror apparatuses [dispositifs de terreur].  
Starting from the 18th century, Western intellectuals tend to perceive religion as an 
inconsistent illusion, an “ideology,” a mystification which has to be cleared-up. They cannot 
take into account the truth nucleus of religion to which Freud refers to. In understating the 
religious dimension of jihadism, the philosophers that you just mentioned make the same 
mistake. The exception is Derrida who took the issue of religion seriously.  His analysis of 
the “return of the religious” as a “self-destructive” and “auto-immune”4 affirmation of 
religion was very useful for me to understand what is at stake in Muslim fundamentalism. 
But Derrida’s work stops right before the threshold of what has to be thought today: how is 
it that this reaffirmation of the religious takes place in the Islamic world in a (self-
)destructive form which is much more virulent and more fanatical than in other religions? 
To understand this phenomenon, I went back through the history of Islam and tried to 
identify what, in this religion, could give rise to the jihadist terror apparatus. We are wrong 
and naïve when we state that jihadism has “nothing to do” with Islam. But it is equally 
wrong when some claim that jihadist terror would show the essence of Islam – and, 
ultimately, the fundamentally-intolerant and fanatical features of every religion. This idea is 
defended by an ever-increasing number of intellectuals and media personalities in France. 
This stance risks “demonizing” Islam by perceiving it as a flawless bloc, completely hostile 
to the West, to democracy, to modernity. On the contrary, we need to find the features 
opposing fundamentalist interpretations in the classic Islamic tradition as well as in its 
founding texts. We need to find these points of resistance which I call the lost treasures of 
Islam [trésors perdus de l’islam]. In rediscovering them, Muslims might be able to resist the 
deadly attraction of fundamentalism and jihadism. 
                                                                                                                                               
Djihadisme: Le Retour du Sacrifice (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 2017), 22-23. See also Jacob Rogozinski, « 
Le philosophe et le djihadiste », Le Monde (February 20, 2015),  
http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2015/02/20/le-philosophe-et-le-djihadiste_4580674_3232.html 
(accessed October 5, 2017). 
2 Slavoj Žižek, Against the Double Blackmail (London: Penguin Books, 2016).  
3 Jean Baudrillard, The Spirit of Terrorism (London: Verso, 2002), 10.  
4 Jacques Derrida, Acts of Religion (New York: Routledge, 2002), 78.  
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PJCV: As a matter of fact, you intend to bypass our current debates which demand us to 
choose between the negation of religion or its demonization. In your book, you state that, 
similarly to Judaism and Christianity, Islam implies a “project of emancipation”5 [“projet 
émancipateur”] which could, in particular, be seen in the Quranic “criticism” of “political 
idolatry.”6 Historical events often betray this project of emancipation – as in the case of 
jihadism in which the hatred of the enemy goes beyond any ideal of justice. Now, at this 
point, how is it possible to avoid the pitfalls of the negation or the demonization of 
religion? Because some might consider the jihadists’ betrayal of the emancipatory project as 
an issue which is alien to religion. And other persons might think that the issue is the 
religious and emancipatory project in itself: either because it conceals a certain resentment, 
or because it fails to properly articulate the temporal with the spiritual…  
 
Jacob Rogozinski: What you call the “negation” of religion may very well correspond to 
its “demonization.” This is a very common stance among Western intellectuals. On the one 
hand, it is said that religion is only an inconsistent illusion – an alienation, an ideology, a 
neurosis – which will soon be cleared-up thanks to the progress of Science and Reason. On 
the other hand, there are worries about the persistence or “return” of this illusion and it is 
then denounced as an “obscurantist” and incomprehensible regression. Either way, there is 
a refusal to enquire the fundamental meaning of religion, or rather of the different 
phenomena that we quite arbitrarily group under this label. It would be better to renounce 
this too massive and static concept of “religion” and to discuss instead “apparatuses of 
belief”. Those are heterogeneous networks, traversed by fractures and lines of flight, which 
are constantly changing and are subject to radical changes. Among these apparatuses, most 
are, in Max Weber’s words, means “of legitimizing domination and the domestication of the 
dominated.” But some of them operate quite differently: as counter-apparatuses or 
apparatuses of emancipation supporting the resistance of the oppressed. This is the case of these 
apparatuses of belief which are Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Their starting point is the 
legendary account of the Exodus telling how slaves threatened with extermination managed 
to free themselves from the “house of bondage” under the leadership of a charismatic 
leader capable to confront the pharaoh. The founding event of Islam is also an exodus 
through the desert which mimetically repeats the legend of Moses. The critique of idolatry 
and the prohibition of worshiping images are first and foremost political: as the 
Egyptologist Jan Assmann reminds us,7 the power of the pharaohs was sacred, and they 
were venerated as “images of the gods.” It is the same sacralisation of power of emperors 
that nascent Christianity will oppose, and the Quran will also denounce the sovereigns’ 
pretence to be worshiped as gods. To me, this critique of political idolatry still seems up to 
date. Just think of how totalitarian leaders like Hitler, Stalin, or Mao have been idolized, 
almost deified by their followers. In the Abrahamic apparatuses of belief, the refusal to 
sacralise political power is founded on a condition of equality between men who are all children 
of Adam and equal before God. It is often said that Ancient Greece has been the birthplace 
                                                          
5 Jacob Rogozinski, Djihadisme : Le Retour du Sacrifice, 127. 
6 Ibid., 134. 
7 See for instance Jan Assmann, Of God and Gods: Egypt, Israel and the Rise of Monotheism (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2008).  
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of democracy, but we forget this other source of modern democracy, namely the legacy of 
the Exodus and this first “Republic of the Hebrews” which Spinoza praised, this political-
religious utopia which also persists in Christian and Muslim traditions. Derrida saw it well 
enough when he wrote that “the modern figure of the democratic state” is “more 
Abrahamic than Greek in its essence.”8 Admittedly, we know that the project of 
emancipation of the Abrahamic religions has been betrayed and abandoned and that it failed 
each time, just as the revolutionary movements of modern times will later fail. Each time, an 
apparatus of domination was rebuilt and the apparatus of belief was used for its 
legitimization. This is not enough to renounce the prospect of human emancipation. 
Socially dominant people, for whom such a perspective is unbearable, accuse these 
movements of being solely motivated by “resentment.” On the contrary, anger, revolt, and 
hope are positive and creative affects as long as they guide men towards a condition of 
equality, that is to say, towards an Idea of justice. This is obviously not the case with terror 
apparatuses such as jihadism, which are driven by the worst negative passions: hatred. 
You ask me a formidable question, that of the articulation between the “temporal” and 
the “spiritual” –  I would rather say: the articulation between apparatuses of power and 
apparatuses of belief. Historical experience shows that no movement of emancipation could 
do without some imaginary identification with heroes or sacred figures. These political 
counter-apparatuses always needed to rely on counter-apparatuses of belief which have 
sometimes taken the form of secular religions, such as the cult of the Supreme Being during 
the French Revolution. Is it the cause of their failures? I am not sure. On the contrary, one 
might think that these two dimensions are inseparable and that there can be no struggle for 
emancipation without a share of messianic hope. If this is the case, it should be concluded 
that the “disenchantment of the world,” that is to say, the general disbelief that we are 
witnessing, is an obstacle to any project of emancipation. But can we conceive a human 
society entirely devoid of beliefs? Can a community persist without its symbolic marks of 
belonging, without collective poles of identification, and could they take a form which 
would not be religious? I admit that I have no answer to these questions.  
 
PJCV: The notion of “apparatus” already plays a key role in your previous book devoted to 
the issue of Witch-Hunting.9 Although you borrow this notion from Foucault, you point 
out that the apparatuses of power (not to be confused with the apparatuses of belief that 
you just mentioned) are not only about exclusion or normalization: one must acknowledge 
the existence of apparatuses of terror and persecution. What are your methodologies for 
describing those apparatuses? 
 
Jacob Rogozinki: I think that philosophy should not be limited to commenting on the 
texts of its own tradition and that it should open itself to the life of men, and especially of 
these “infamous men” mentioned by Foucault: these “lowly-lives reduced to ashes,”10 
                                                          
8 Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death & Literature in Secret (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008): 
110.   
9 Jacob Rogozinski, Ils m’ont haï sans raison : de la chasse aux sorcières à la Terreur (Paris : Editions du Cerf, 
2015). 
10 Michel Foucault, Power, Truth, Strategy (Sidney University: Feral Publications, 1979), 77.  
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ignored by official history devoid of pheme – of reputation – and whose existence simply left 
a trace in archives “at the point of their instantaneous contact with power.”11 I aimed to 
understand the logic of hatred, this affect which I already analysed from a 
phenomenological point of view in The Ego and the Flesh.12 A purely conceptual analysis did 
not seem sufficient to me and I decided to direct my researches towards history. My aim 
was to understand how hatred occurred in a historical phenomenon of persecution, such as 
the Great Witch Hunt which killed hundreds of thousands of people from the 15th to the 
17th century. So, I used the materials of the historians who made us aware of this 
persecution - above all, the admirable works of Michelet and Carlo Ginzburg. Thanks to 
them, it was possible for me to listen to the muffled voices of those men and women who 
had been silenced, tortured, murdered. I had to develop new concepts, in particular the 
concept of apparatus of persecution or terror apparatus. They are apparatuses in a Foucauldian 
sense, but they are different from the apparatuses of exclusion and normalization that he 
analysed in Madness and Civilization and in Discipline and Punish. The purpose of those 
apparatuses is not to confine, expel or “discipline” the men they target, but to annihilate 
them. I wanted to understand how apparatuses of persecution can capture the affects of the 
masses to use them as means for their own strategies. The turning point which made the 
capture of affects possible are certain intermediate representations that I decided to call 
schemas. This is a concept that I borrowed from Kant but I gave it a slightly different 
meaning which is more “practical” and not just theoretical. This enabled me to understand 
another phenomenon that Foucault did not thoroughly examine. He did not see that 
apparatuses could sometimes mutate and turn into apparatuses of another type. In that 
respect, the apparatus of exclusion and confinement of the lepers later turned into an 
apparatus of persecution. All of a sudden, in 1320, in the south-west of France, lepers were 
accused of “conspiring” with the Jews against Christians. Immediately, furious crowds 
invade the leprosariums, then the ghettos by massacring their inhabitants, and the 
persecution quickly spreads to the whole kingdom. How can we account for this shift from 
exclusion to persecution? Among the schemas that are at work in witch hunt, and already in 
the persecution of lepers and Jews in the Middle Ages, the schema of the conspiracy plays a 
decisive role. Each time, these different targets are accused of being part of a “conspiracy” 
that attempts to ruin the authority of the Church and the state in order to seize power. 
From then, it is no longer sufficient to exclude them through confinement into ghettos or 
leprosariums: the mere fact of their existence becomes a threat and they must be 
exterminated. This schema of persecution is both persistent and flexible: it runs through 
centuries by changing its targets and adapting itself to new historical contexts. And even if it 
sometimes seems that this schema disappears, it is each time reactivated and reappears in 
new forms. A few years ago, who would have thought that the old myth of the evil 
“conspiracy” would reappear at the beginning of the 21st century and spread so massively 
on the Internet? And yet, however persistent they may be, such schemas are not timeless 
archetypes: they were made in the course of history and we might hope, after important 
                                                          
11 Ibid., 80.  
12 Jacob Rogozinski, The Ego and the Flesh, trans. Robert Vallier (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 
2010).  
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social transformations and a long and patient work of criticism and education, that they will 
eventually disappear one day.  
I must say that I would never have engaged in this witch-hunt research if I had not 
sought for years to understand another, even deadlier, persecution: The Holocaust. I never 
managed to understand it before, probably because this event concerned me too directly in 
my family history. In choosing a more historically distant persecution phenomenon as a 
research topic, I have come to understand the logic of hatred and how it can, by means of 
certain schemas, engage itself into apparatuses of persecution and terror.  
 
PJCV: You define the schema as an “imaginary representation charged with affects”13 
[“representation imaginaire investie d’affects”]. According to you, it is naïve to suppose that 
the apparatus of jihadist terror could be reducible to the founding text of the Quran. 
Jihadism needs to “mobilize the desires and passions of men”14 [“mobiliser les désirs et les 
passions des hommes”] through schemas. By the same token, you state that the 
psychiatrization of jihadism (which equates the phenomenon with a form of modern 
nihilism) tends to ignore the politico-religious dimension of those schemas. Jihadism is not 
only motivated by the hope of “dying to be reborn”15 [“mourir pour renaître”], but also by 
apocalyptic and messianic concerns such as the ultimate battle of Dabiq, the confrontation 
with the evil figure of Al-Masih ad-Dajjal and the coming of the Madhi (i.e. the eschatological 
redeemer of Islam). Could you expand on this and tell us what makes those schemas 
attractive to some people today? 
 
Jacob Rogozinski: Although they persist through centuries, schemas appear in history and 
they are not static: they change by dissociating themselves into several distinct or even 
opposite schemas or, on the contrary, by associating – sometimes even merging – 
themselves with other schemas. Since they are flexible, they can be incorporated into very 
different apparatuses of power or belief. In the Torah, the name “messiah” designates the 
Lord’s anointed, that is to say the one who received the sacred anointing and thus became 
endowed with a divine mission. At first, this schema is completely different from the 
representation of an end of times. It is only later that it tends to merge with the schema of 
the apocalypse. Then, it incorporates a series of representations that will become 
inseparable from him such as the announcement of a final battle between Good and Evil 
and of the destruction of our world and the birth of a new one: a Kingdom of justice where 
evil will have vanished. At about the same time, at the beginning of the Christian era, this 
schema divides itself into two antagonistic figures, now opposing the divine Messiah and a 
satanic anti-messiah whom the Christians call the Antichrist and the Muslims the Dajjal (the 
Imposter). It is in this form that the messianic schema will cross the entire western history. 
It underlies the millenarian uprisings of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Then, it will 
lose its initial religious dimension, and one can find it later in modern times in the 
emancipatory movements and the “secular religions” they generate. The revolutionary class 
                                                          
13 Jacob Rogozinski, Djihadisme : Le Retour du Sacrifice, 58.  
14 Ibid., 59.  
15 Ibid., 61.  
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which Marx calls the proletariat has a Messianic dimension, and the Communist Revolution 
manifests itself in this new belief as a transposition of the Christian Apocalypse. Each time, 
this schema captures an affect which motivates all revolts: hope. This schema can also 
associate hope with other affects which are apparently very different. In that respect, hope 
in the coming of the Messiah and an intense hatred towards the anti-messiah and his 
henchmen can go hand in hand, and they can actively support apparatuses of persecution 
and terror. The same schema can be found in the tradition of Islam. Even today, many 
Muslims continue to await the arrival of the Mahdi, the Messianic Saviour, and his victorious 
fight against the Dajjal. According to the tradition, this battle will take place in Dabiq, in 
northern Syria, and will be the prelude to the final judgement. In my opinion, it is 
impossible to understand jihadism and its attraction for certain Muslims without taking into 
account its messianic and apocalyptic dimension. It is no coincidence that one of Daesh’s 
magazines is entitled Dabiq, and that this movement favoured the technique of suicide-
attack. When a jihadist fighter blows himself up to kill men whom the apparatus points out 
as enemies, he hopes to “die as a martyr” and reach eternal life. On the individual as well as 
on the collective level, it is a question of dying to be reborn. This schema is so conspicuously 
present in Daesh’s strategy that it gives it an oddly suicidal and self-destructive appearance. I 
do think that the belief in the resurrection is not a mere illusion. It is rooted in a primordial 
phantasm whose origin lies in the life of our Self and which appears in different ways in 
individual and collective existence (I aimed at describing the genesis of this phantasm in The 
Ego and the Flesh). 
 
PJCV: You mention Benoît Chantre in the acknowledgements of your book.  In the paper 
he wrote for our dossier on jihadism,16 Chantre frequently defends ideas very similar to 
yours such as the critique of the theories of the “end of religion,” the refusal to reduce 
jihadism to a “nihilism in a religious guise” and the hypothesis of a return of archaic 
violence within Islam. But Chantre draws his conclusion starting from a different 
framework: René Girard’s mimetic theory. Could we say that your two perspectives imply 
comparable results while resting on two rather different conceptions of sacrifice? Your 
approach of the issue of sacrifice reminds me more of Freud and of some of Joseph de 
Maistre’s intuitions than Girard’s mimetic theory…  
 
Jacob Rogozinski: I would probably never have written this book without Benoît 
Chantre’s friendly insistence. We worked closely together on this book and, as you 
mentioned, our stances on the issue of jihadism are often similar. I have a lot of admiration 
for René Girard’s mimetic theory, even if, according to me, some of its aspects need to be 
amended and supplemented. In this respect, his concept of “violence” seems too abstract 
and undifferentiated to me. There are several types of violence implemented by different 
apparatuses, and Girard is wrong by only taking into account the most extreme violence – 
murder – and by ignoring the more subtle, insidious forms of violence which are exclusion 
or normalization and discipline. It also seems to me that he was not interested enough in 
                                                          
16 Benoît Chantre, “Terrorism and Democracy”, The Philosophical Journal of Conflict and Violence 1/2 
(2017).  
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the sublimation and symbolization processes which are at work in the apparatuses of belief. 
This is why he tends to reject most religions – with the exception of Christianity and, to 
some extent, Judaism – and situates them on the side of archaic sacredness and sacrificial 
violence. But the main limitation of his theory is that its scope is restricted to the sole plane 
of collective phenomena. The “mimetic rivalry” which is the cornerstone of his 
anthropology already supposes two, or rather three, individuals. On the contrary, I think 
that the phenomena which appear on this plane are rooted in a more originary dimension, 
that is to say in the relation of each singular Self to its own Flesh – or, more exactly, to a 
part of his Flesh, to a “remainder” [restant] that he must either incorporate or reject outside of 
him. This expulsion of the “remainder” is re-enacted on the collective level in various 
practices, rites and symbols. The retrenchment and transfiguration of this heterogeneous 
element is staged in sacrificial rituals. The “cuisine of sacrifice” always consists in extracting 
from the dismembered body of the victim a share reserved for the gods or for God. It is a 
human or animal victim distinct from the sacrificer, but to whom he identifies. Sacrificial 
rites originate in an auto-sacrifice: it is a part of our Flesh and of our Self which has to be 
expelled and destroyed. At the same time, this part of the Flesh will be purified and 
sacralised in order to offer it to a deity. As shown by the founding myth of the three 
Abrahamic religions (i.e. Isaac’s sacrifice interrupted by God’s intervention), apparatuses of 
belief have, in different ways, attempted to neutralize and appease (auto-) sacrificial 
violence. In Judaism, it was done through the substitution of bloody sacrifice with the study 
of the Law. In Christianity, through the symbolical re-enactment of sacrifice in the offering 
of the Eucharist. In Islam, through the restricted prescription to sacrifice a sheep only once 
a year. In another context, Buddhism also sought to sublimate the sacrificial violence of the 
ancient Vedic religion. Jihadists radically oppose these attempts to restrict and sublimate the 
archaic violence of sacrifice. In committing sacrificial suicides, they return to a practice their 
religion had always forbidden. 
 
PJCV: Your book does not address many issues of fundamentalist internet propaganda and 
networks financing jihadism. Is it because you would like to study these aspects in a future 
work or because, in your view, a philosophical approach to these questions seems less 
relevant? 
 
Jacob Rogozinski: These questions seem less relevant to me. We are often too focused on 
the medium and tend to forget the message. Massive dissemination of executions and 
torture on the internet surely is Daesh’s “trademark” but, with the exception of this 
medium, there is nothing new here. The spectacular exhibition of cruelty has always been 
the prerogative of political or religious sovereignty, as shown by the pyres of the Inquisition 
or by what Foucault called “the spectacle of the scaffold”17 [“L’éclat des supplices”] under the 
monarchies of the classical age. This enables these apparatuses to exhibit their sovereign 
power and terrorize their subjects. 
 
                                                          
17 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 32-69.  
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PJCV: Unlike many French intellectuals, you do not mock statements such as “Je suis 
Charlie” or “You will not have my hate” [“Vous n’aurez pas ma haine”] ... 
 
Jacob Rogozinski: “Je suis Charlie” did not necessarily mean a support of the libertarian and 
anticlerical style of this newspaper, a style which is typically French and often 
misunderstood abroad. Anyway, it is wrong to see any kind of contempt or hatred against 
Muslims in this statement which, above all, was the expression of our solidarity with all the 
victims of jihadist terror, whoever they may be. During the big demonstration of January 
2015, some placards claimed: “I am Charlie, I am Jewish, I am policeman, I am Muslim ...”. 
I am very attached to the other statement: “You will not have my hate.” This is the title of a 
beautiful book by Antoine Leiris,18 whose wife was murdered by jihadists at the Bataclan in 
November 2015. This statement teaches us not to respond to hatred by hatred -- that is, not 
imitate those who consider us as “absolute enemies” who need extermination. I do think 
that there is no “good use” of hate – because hatred only calls for hatred: when we respond 
to terror with a mimetic counter-terror, we risk becoming involved in an unending conflict. 
I would however like to clarify that to renounce hatred does not equal renouncing 
resistance. Those who hate us and wish to annihilate us must be fought without hatred. In 
this fight against jihadism, our best allies are the Muslims themselves, all those Muslims who 
refuse this deadly fanaticism which disfigures their religion. 
 
Interview conducted by Andreas Wilmes 
Translated by Sandra-Lia Roşu & Andreas Wilmes 
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